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FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Justice White's theory does, however, offer a rational approach to
prejudgment creditors' remedies and a means to arrive at a loose
reconciliation of Sniadach, Fuentes, Mitchell, and Di-Chem. Adoption
of that theory would thus make it far easier to evaluate the constitu-
tionality of various creditors' remedies. A majority of the Court might
balk at equating "adequate safeguards" with judicial supervision of
summary procedures, but the remaining elements of Justice White's
test-as yet unarticulated in a prejudgment remedies case-may ultimate-
ly become law. It is at least clear that so long as Justice White holds
a key vote in prejudgment seizure cases, legislators and lawyers who
ignore the rationale propounded in Arnett risk adverse decisions in the
United States Supreme Court.
JOHN JEFFERSON RIMES III
Constitutional Law-VAGRANCY-FLORIDA'S LOITERING STATUTE UPHELD
AS CONSTITUTIONAL WHEN CONSTRUED To PROHIBIT LOITERING WHICH
THREATENS PUBLIC SAFETY OR A BREACH OF THE PEACE.-State v. Ecker,
311 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 1975).
In February 1975, four consolidated cases from Dade County1
tested for the first time the constitutionality of Florida's loitering
statute. 2 The various defendants were arrested for loitering or prowl-
1. State v. Ecker, 311 So. 2d 104, 106 (Fla. 1975).
2. FLA. STAT. § 856.021 (1975), provides:
(1) It is unlawful for any person to loiter or prowl in a place, at a time or in
a manner not usual for law-abiding individuals, under circumstances that warrant
a justifiable and reasonable alarm or immediate concern for the safety of persons
or property in the vicinity.
(2) Among the circumstances which may be considered in determining whether
such alarm or immediate concern is warranted is the fact that the person takes
flight upon appearance of a law enforcement officer, refuses to identify himself, or
manifestly endeavors to conceal himself or any object. Unless flight by the person
or other circumstances makes it impracticable, a law enforcement officer shall, prior
to any arrest for an offense under this section, afford the person an opportunity to
dispel any alarm or immediate concern which would otherwise be warranted by
requesting him to identify himself and explain his presence and conduct.
No person shall be convicted of an offense under this section if the law
enforcement officer did not comply with this procedure or if it appears at trial
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ing in a place, manner, and time not usual for law-abiding citizens
and under circumstances which threatened public safety. Defendant
Bell was observed crouching behind some shrubbery near a private
dwelling in the early morning hours. He attempted to flee when ap-
proached by police officers. Bell was found guilty of violating section
856.021, Florida Statutes.3 Defendant Worth was observed in a ware-
house area at night by three citizens. Fearing that Worth's plan was
to strip an automobile in the area, the citizens apprehended the sus-
pect and summoned the police.4 Defendant Ecker was seen standing
in front of an apartment building. Ecker was arrested when he was
unable to produce proper identification upon an officer's request. The
lower court dismissed the complaint against Ecker, holding that sec-
tion 856.021, the statute upon which the complaint was based, was
unconstitutional. The complaint against defendant Harris was similar-
ly dismissed by the lower court.5
Defendants Bell and Worth brought direct appeals from trial court
convictions under section 856.021, Florida Statutes. The State of
Florida brought appeals with respect to dependants Ecker and Harris
because the lower court had found the statute unconstitutional. On
appeal, Florida's loitering statute was attacked by the defendants as
being vague, overbroad, subject to arbitrary enforcement, and requiring
self-incrimination. In State v. Ecker the Supreme Court of Florida ad-
dressed and rejected each of these contentions, upholding the statute
as constitutional.
that the explanation given by the person is true and, if believed by the officer at
the time, would have dispelled the alarm or immediate concern.
(3) Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor of the second degree ....
3. 311 So. 2d at 110-11. The trial court found that the circumstances surrounding
the incident were sufficient to justify an arrest. The court concluded that Bell's surrepti-
tious conduct at an early hour had caused a reasonable concern by the arresting
officers for the safety of persons and property in the area. The defendant's attempted
flight, coupled with the presence of a stolen tag on his automobile, raised an issue of
credible identification.
During the trial, the defendant took the stand on his own behalf in order to explain
his presence and conduct in defense to the charge. The defendant testified that his
car had "quit" and that he was searching for help. The arresting officer testified, how-
ever, that following arrest the defendant's automobile had been driven to the impound-
ment area without difficulty. Id.
4. 311 So. 2d at 111. Since the citizens who had observed Worth failed to testify
at the trial, the supreme court found that the elements of the offense were not properly
established even though the circumstances implied a violation of the statute. Id.
5. 311 So. 2d at 111.
6. Id. In disposing of the cases on appeal, the court affirmed the conviction of de-
fendant Bell, finding that the elements of the offense had been established. The majority
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Since 1972, Florida and many municipalities have attempted to
correct the constitutional infirmities of city and state vagrancy and
loitering statutes. In that year, the United States Supreme Court
struck down the vagrancy ordinance of Jacksonville, Florida,7 in
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville.8 The Court held that the ordinance
nevertheless voiced disapproval of the arresting officer's statement that he had arrested
Bell for loitering "because we could not prove anything else." The court warned that
the statute should not be unconstitutionally applied as a "catchall" offense; each element
of the crime enunciated in the statute must be established for a conviction to be obtained.
Id. at 111.
The Ecker court noted that the testimony in the trial against the defendant Worth
primarily consisted of statements made by the defendant to police officers after his
Miranda warnings had been read to him. The court found the content of these state-
ments, without more, insufficient to establish an offense under § 856.021. The citizens
who had observed the defendant's peculiar conduct and summoned the police were
not called to testify against the defendant. Because the arresting officers did not observe
the circumstances which caused the citizens' concern, the offense was not properly
established by the officers' testimony. The majority therefore reversed the conviction
against Worth. Id.
The supreme court reversed the trial court's finding in State v. Ecker that § 856.021
was unconstitutional, but affirmed the dismissal of the complaint against Ecker. The
charge failed to allege facts which established that the defendant had threatened the
public safety. Id.
The lower court's holding that Florida's loitering statute was unconstitutional in
State v. Harris was also reversed, and the case remanded to the trial court. The supreme
court was unable to make a final determination concerning this case as the record on
appeal included neither the complaint nor the charge against the defendant. Id.
7. The Court in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 156-57 (1972), quot-
ing a Jacksonville, Florida, ordinance which was in effect at the time of these arrests
and convictions, stated:
Rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about begging, common
gamblers, persons who use juggling or unlawful games or plays, common drunkards,
common night walkers, thieves, pilferers or pickpockets, traders in stolen property,
lewd, wanton and lascivious persons, keepers of gambling places, common railers
and brawlers, persons wandering or strolling around from place to place without
any lawful purpose or object, habitual loafers, disorderly persons, persons neglecting
all lawful business and habitually spending their time by frequenting houses
of ill fame, gaming houses, or places where alcoholic beverages are sold or
served, persons able to work but habitually living upon the earnings of their
wives or minor children shall be deemed vagrants ....
8. 405 U.S. 156 (1972). Papachristou is the first case in which the United States
Supreme Court directly ruled upon the constitutionality of vagrancy laws. Earlier
cases dealing with vagrancy statutes were based upon either procedural grounds or
decided upon a narrow holding. For example, in Johnson v. Florida, 391 U.S. 596 (1968),
the Supreme Court reversed a conviction under a Florida law prohibiting "wandering or
strolling . . . without any lawful purpose or object." The Court held that the evidence
was insufficient to convict the defendant, refusing to rule on the constitutionality of the
statute itself. In Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544 (1971), the Supreme Court con-
sidered an Ohio ordinance which allowed arrest of
any person who wanders about the streets or other public ways or who is
found abroad at late or unusual hours in the night without any visible or lawful
business and who does not give satisfactory account of himself.
Id. at 544. The Court's holding, however, was narrow and failed to provide much
[Vol. 4
CASE COMMENTS
was subject to the constitutional infirmities of vagueness, overbreadth,
and arbitrary enforcement. The Court concluded that the ordinance
was vague because it failed to provide notice of the prohibited conduct
to the potential offender as well as to the police.9 The absence of
specific statutory criteria for determining whether a person had com-
mitted an offense under this section rendered the statute subject to
arbitrary enforcement; a police officer could exercise virtually un-
fettered discretion in determining what conduct constituted an offense,
and arrest whomever he pleased. 10 Due to the ordinance's vagueness and
its susceptibility to arbitrary enforcement, the ordinance was overbroad
in that it permitted an arrest for innocent, constitutionally protected
conduct as well as for criminal activities.- The Court noted that the
guidance for other states in their struggle to determine the constitutionality of similar
statutes. In reversing the conviction of defendant Palmer, the Court held that "as applied
to Palmer, [the ordinance] failed to give 'a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice
that his contemplated conduct [was] forbidden ...... 402 U.S. at 545, quoting United
States v. Harriss. 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954).
9. 405 U.S. at 162, 168.
The Constitution requires a higher standard of certainty in criminal than in
civil statutes. See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948). Cf. Wright v. Georgia, 373
U.S. 284, 293 (1963); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939); Champlin
Ref. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 242 (1932).
Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926) is one of a long line of cases
enunciating the due process requirement of notice:
[A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.
Id. at 391.
The Supreme Court of Florida has often enunciated this due process requirement.
See e.g., Zachary v. State, 269 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 1972); State v. Buchanan, 191 So. 2d 33
(Fla. 1966). The Constitution, however, does not require impossible standards. The United
States Supreme Court has held that the existence of marginal cases where it is difficult
to determine whether conduct falls within the statute's proscriptions, does not necessarily
render a statute too ambiguous to define a criminal offense. Robinson v. United States,
324 U.S. 282, 285-86 (1945). Accord, Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 231 (1951); United
States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7 (1947).
10. The Supreme Court noted that "[w]here . . . there are no standards governing
the exercise of the discretion granted by the ordinance, the scheme permits and encourages
an arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the law." 405 U.S. at 170.
Definiteness is typically avoided in such statutes to allow the arrest of persons "who
are vaguely undesirable in the eyes of police and prosecution, although not chargeable
with any particular offense." 405 U.S. at 166, quoting Frankfurter, J., dissenting in Winters
v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 540 (1948). The Court stated:
It would be . . . unfortunate if . . . where there is not enough evidence to
charge the [person] with an attempt to commit a crime, the prosecution may,
nevertheless, on such insufficient evidence, succeed in obtaining and upholding a
conviction under the [vagrancy law] . . ..
Id. at 170, quoting Frederick Dean, 18 Crim. App. 133, 134 (1924).
11. The distinctions and the interrelationships between the concepts of vagueness,
arbitrary enforcement, and overbreadth are often confused. The void-for-vagueness
doctrine contains two aspects: (1) fair warning to the potential offender (see, e.g.,
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Jacksonville ordinance resulted "in a regime in which the poor and the
unpopular [were] permitted to 'stand on a public sidewalk ... only at
the whim of any police officer.' ",12
As an intervening defendant in Papachristou, the State of Florida
attempted to justify the vagrancy law as a necessary tool for the preven-
tion of crime.'3 The Court responded by enunciating the fourth
amendment's requirement of probable cause as a basis for arrest;14
arrests on suspicion, said the Court, do not satisfy this constitutional
Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)); and (2) precise standards
to guide police officers, judges, and juries in determining whether an offense has been
committed under the statute's terms (see, e.g., Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 96 (1948);
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515-16 (1948); Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine
in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67, 68 n.3 (1960)). It is this second aspect
of the vagueness doctrine which is referred to when a statute is said to be subject to
arbitrary enforcement. Cf. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 168 (1972).
A statute may, however, be either vague or overbroad, or suffer from both these
constitutional infirmities. A statute is overbroad if under its terms conduct which the
state may not constitutionally regulate is subject to proscription. Overbreadth may
result in one of two ways. The terms of a statute may be so vague that its subjects
constitutionally protected activities to arrest as well as conduct which the statute may
validly regulate. See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 509 (1948). The language of
a statute may, however, clearly define the prohibited conduct and thus not suffer
from vagueness, yet be overbroad by infringing upon constitutionally protected free-
doms. See Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 250 (1967).
Alternatively, a statute may not suffer from overbreadth and yet be struck down as
unconstitutionally vague. See Connally v. General Constr. Co., supra at 391. This con-
cept is illustrated by what has been termed the "true uncertainty case" under the void-
for-vagueness doctrine:
[In] the "true" uncertainty case . . . a legislature which might constitutionally
have proscribed either or both of two classes of behavior, A and B, has chosen to
proscribe only A, but in language so uncertain that whether most fact situations
are A or B is a matter for guesswork ....
109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 76 (1960). In the "true" uncertainty case, the statute is not over-
broad, as the legislature may constitutionally prohibit both classes of activity; but it
suffers from vagueness by failing to provide notice to the citizen and guidelines for
police, prosecutors and the triers of fact.
12. 405 U.S. at 170, citing Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90 (1965).
13. Historically vagrancy laws have served purposes other than crime prevention.
In feudal times vagrancy laws protected the rights of the lords in their fugitive serfs
by subjecting wanderers to arrest. These laws also attempted to place the burden of
the poor on their home districts, punishing beggars found outside of such areas. After
the black death destroyed nearly half the population, the Statute of Labourers com-
pelled individuals to work for anyone willing to pay the customary wage. Such laws
also sought to control bands of wandering robbers which emerged as the feudal system
began to decay. Today, the control of potential criminals and other undesirables re-
mains the common justification for these laws. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.12, Comment
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1961).
14. The citizen's fourth amendment right of freedom from unreasonable searches
and seizures is based upon the common law "right of every individual to the possession
and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless
by clear and unquestionable authority of law." Union Pacific Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S.
250, 251 (1891).
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mandate.15 The implied statutory presumption that all persons who
loitered or looked suspicious to the police were potential criminals
was deemed "extravagant," and the ordinance itself was found to be
"plainly unconstitutional."' 1
Subsequent to Papachristou, the Florida Legislature repealed the
state's vagrancy statute, which was similar to the Jacksonville ordinance
found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court." The state's vagrancy
statute was replaced with the present "loitering or prowling" provision
of the Model Penal Code. 18 State v. Ecker considered the Model Penal
15. In Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949), the Supreme Court said
that probable cause
has come to mean more than bare suspicion: Probable cause exists where "the facts
and circumstances within their [the officers'] knowledge and of which they [have]
reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man
of reasonable caution in the belief that" an offense has been or is being committed.
338 U.S. at 175-76, quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925).
In Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), the Court made it clear that probable
cause cannot be "manufactured" by the mere enactment of a statute.
[The state] may not, however, authorize police conduct which trenches upon
Fourth Amendment rights, regardless of the labels which it attaches to such
conduct. The question . . . "is not whether the search [or seizure] was authorized
by state law . . . [but] whether [it was] reasonable tinder the Fourth Amendment."
392 U.S. at 61, quoting Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 61 (1967).
16. 405 U.S. at 171.
17. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-132, § 17A, repealed by the Florida legislature in 1972,
provided:
Vagrants.-Rogues and vagabonds, idle or dissolute persons who go about
begging, common gamblers, persons who use juggling, or unlawful games or plays,
common pipers and fiddlers, common night walkers, thieves, pilferers, traders in
stolen property, lewd, wanton and lascivious persons, keepers of gambling places,
common railers and brawlers, persons who neglect their calling or employment,
or are without reasonably continuous employment or regular income and who have
not sufficient property to sustain them and misspend what they earn without
providing for themselves or the support of their families, persons wandering or
strolling around from place to place without any lawful purpose or object,
habitual loafers, idle and disorderly persons, persons neglecting all lawful business
and habitually spending their time by frequenting houses of ill fame or gaming
houses, persons able to work but habitually living upon the earnings of their wives
or minor children, and all able bodied male persons over the age of eighteen years
who are without means of support and remain in idleness, shall be deemed
vagrants ....
For text of Jacksonville ordinance, and FLA. STAr. § 856.021 (1973) (which replaced Fla.
Laws 1971, ch. 71-132, § 17A), see notes 7, 2 respectively, supra.
18. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.6 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962), as codified in FLA.
STAT. § 856.021 (1973). This Code provision replaced the Code's former "suspicious
loitering" provision which provided:
A person who loiters or wanders without apparent reason or business in a
place or manner not usual for law-abiding individuals and under circumstances
which justify suspicion that he may be engaged or about to engage in crime
commits a violation if he refuses the request of a peace officer that he identify
himself and give a reasonably credible account of the lawfulness of his conduct
and purposes.
1976]
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Code's provision as codified in the Florida law and held that it passed
constitutional muster. The defendants in Ecker relied upon the consti-
tutional deficiencies found by the United States Supreme Court in
Papachristou, alleging that the Florida statute was vague, overbroad,
and subject to arbitrary enforcement.
In addition, the defendants attacked the provision of the loitering
statute which afforded a suspect an opportunity to avoid arrest by
identifying himself and offering a reasonable explanation for his
presence and conduct.19 The defendants alleged that this provision
violated a suspect's fifth amendment privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination. They contended that section 856.021 required a suspect
to explain his presence and conduct and to identify himself in order
to avoid an arrest.20 The suspect was subject to arrest if he chose
to exercise his constitutional right to remain silent, or if he made
incriminating statements while availing himself of the statutory "op-
portunity" to avoid arrest.
The Supreme Court of Florida rejected each of these arguments,
utilizing statutory construction to save section 856.021 from constitu-
tional attack. The Ecker court reiterated the elements of the offense as
MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.12 (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1961).
In the comments to the new "loitering or prowling" provision, which section was
subsequently adopted by the Florida legislature, the drafters strongly implied that
§ 250.12 was repealed because of its susceptibility to constitutional attack.
We have changed the basis of the offense from justifiable "suspicion" that the
actor was engaged or about to engage in crime, to justifiable "alarm" for the
safety of persons or property. This seems desirable to save the section from attack
and possible invalidation as a subterfuge by which the police would be empowered
to arrest and search without probable cause.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.6, Comment (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
The drafters' reservations in rendering such conduct an offense were clearly ex-
pressed in the Comment dealing with the "suspicious loitering" provision, which states:
The proposals here made to penalize what might be called "suspicious loiter-
ing," are all that would be left in the . . . ancient protean offense designated
"vagrancy," if indeed even this much should be retained in a code of substantive
penal law. The reasons for doubt ... are that a statute which makes it a penal
offense for a person to fail to identify himself and give an exculpatory account of
his presence is in effect an extension of the law of arrest, and trenches on the
privilege against self-incrimination. It authorizes arrest of persons who have not
given reasonable ground for believing that they are engaged in or have committed
offenses. Alternatively, it can be regarded as a legislative determination that in
"suspicious" circumstances, failure to respond to police inquiries supplies reason-
able ground.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.12, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1961). In referring the read-
er of the new provision, § 250.6, to this commentary, the Institute indicated that the
reservations expressed with respect to the original sections are equally applicable to the
revised provision.
19. See note 2 supra for text of FLA, S'rAT. § 856.021 (1975).
20. 311 So. 2d at 109.
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enumerated in the statute: 1) Loitering or prowling in a place, at a
time or in a manner not usual for law-abiding persons; and 2) such con-
duct occurring under circumstances which warranted a reasonable alarm
for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity.21 The majority
construed the second element to "mean those circumstances where
peace and order are threatened or where the safety of persons or pro-
perty is jeopardized. '" 22
In response to the argument that the statute was vague and over-
broad, thereby encroaching upon constitutionally protected liberties,
the Florida court relied upon the United States Supreme Court cases
of Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham2 3 and Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire .2 4 The Florida court noted that the statutes upheld in those
cases prohibited conduct which threatened a breach of the peace or
the public safety; it determined that section 856.021 also proscribes
such conduct. 25 Based upon statutory construction and its reliance upon
Shuttlesworth and Chaplinsky, the Ecker court concluded that Florida's
loitering statute narrowly defined conduct which the state was con-
stitutionally empowered to prohibit. Therefore, reasoned the court,
section 856.021 was neither vague nor overbroad. 21 Moreover, the
21. Id. at 106.
22. Id. at 109.
23. 382 U.S. 87 (1965). Shuttlesworth upheld an ordinance which prohibited loiter-
ing on a street or sidewalk so as to obstruct traffic, and refusing to comply with a police
officer's order to move on. The Court, quoting the Birmingham, Alabama, Code, stated:
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . to so stand, loiter or walk upon any
street or sidewalk . . . as to obstruct free passage over, on or along said street or
sidewalk. It shall also be unlawful for any person to stand or loiter upon any
street or sidewalk ... after having been requested by any police officer to move on.
382 U.S. at 88. The Supreme Court observed that a literal reading of the statute
allowed a person to stand on a sidewalk only at the whim of a police officer. The
Court declared that:
The constitutional vice of so broad a provision needs no demonstration. It "does
not provide for government by clearly defined laws, but rather for government
by the moment-to-moment opinions of a policeman on his beat."
382 U.S. at 90 (footnotes omitted), quoting Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 579 (1965)
(separate opinion of Mr. Justice Black concurring in part). The Alabama court of appeals
had, however, interpreted the provision to allow a police officer to order a person to
move on only after traffic had been obstructed. The Supreme Court held that the
statute, as construed, was constitutional.
24. 315 U.S. 568 (1942). In Chaplinsky the Supreme Court approved a statute which
prohibited the public use of offensive words which were deemed to directly tend to
provoke the addressee to violence. The test is not the subjective opinion of the addressee,
but "'what men of common intelligence would understand would be words likely to
cause an average addressee to fight.'" 315 U.S. at 573. Utilizing this test, the
Court determined that the statute prohibited the use of "the lewd . . . the profane, the
libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words . Id. at 572.
25. 311 So. 2d at 109.
26. id.
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statute did not, in the court's opinion, confer unbridled arrest powers
upon law enforcement officials, and thus was not subject to arbitrary
enforcement. To justify an arrest, the police officer must point to
"specific and articulable facts" to show that a breach of the peace
was imminent or that the public safety was threatened. 27
In response to the appellant's contention that the requirement of
identification infringed upon the suspect's fifth amendment rights,
the court noted the United States Supreme Court's decision in Cali-
fornia v. Byers.28 In Byers the Supreme Court sustained a regulatory
statute which carried criminal sanctions for non-compliance with its
provisions. The statute required a driver involved in an automobile
accident which resulted in property damage to leave his name and
address at the scene of the accident.29 The Supreme Court found that
information in the form of a name and address was essentially neutral,
and the mere possibility that it might tend to incriminate the driver
was too remote to be of constitutional significance.30 Based upon the
Byers rationale, the Ecker court found no constitutional violation in
requiring credible and reliable identification under circumstances
where the public safety was threatened. The court held that such
identification, and compliance by the suspect with the officer's orders
necessary to remove the threat, would preclude an arrest under the
statute.3 The Ecker court noted, however, that immediate arrest is
proper if an individual whom the police officer believes to be a
threat flees when confronted by the officer.3 2
The Florida court recognized that to require a suspect to explain
his presence and conduct to a police officer under threat of arrest might
well violate the individual's fifth amendment privilege against com-
pulsory self-incrimination. Therefore, in construing the statute, the
court held the issues of identification and explanation were separate
and distinct. The court noted that the issue of explanation
is an additional defense to the charge. Clearly, an accused cannot
be compelled to explain his presence and conduct without first being
properly advised under Miranda standards. If the accused voluntarily
explains his presence and such explanation dispels the alarm, no
charge can be made.34
27. Id.
28. 402 U.S. 424 (1971).
29. CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 20002(a) (West 1971).
30. 402 U.S. at 431.
31. 311 So. 2d at 109.
32. Id. at 110.
33. Id.
34. 311 So. 2d at 110. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Supreme
[V/ol. 4
1976] CASE COMMENTS
In addition, if it appeared at trial that the suspect's explanation was
true, and that the explanation would have dispelled the alarm if be-
lieved by the arresting officer, a conviction could not be obtained under
the statute. 5
Under the construction of Florida's loitering statute rendered by
the Ecker court, the constitutional difficulties are too numerous to
ignore. The majority has seemingly misconstrued the Supreme Court
cases upon which its opinion is based, and has failed to address other
important precedents established by the United States Supreme Court
in the area of civil liberties.
In dismissing the allegation that the loitering statute was vague
and overbroad, the Florida majority relied upon the Supreme Court
cases of Chaplinsky and Shuttlesworth. The statutes upheld in these
cases did, in fact, prohibit conduct which threatened the public safety,
as Florida's loitering statute purports to do. Unlike the statutes in
these two cases, Florida's loitering statute fails to specifically define
the conduct which constitutes the proscribed threat to the public
safety. In Shuttlesworth&6 and Chaplinsky,87 and in other lower court
cases where similar statutes have been upheld, the term "loiter" point-
ed to a prohibited act, described more specifically elsewhere in the
Court held:
[W]hen an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
• . . in any significant way and is subjected to questioning . . . . [h]e must
be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that
anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has
the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney
one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires ...
[Otherwise] no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against
him.
384 U.S. at 478-79. In Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969), the Supreme Court made
it clear that a formal arrest is not required to necessitate such warnings.
35. 311 So. 2d at 106.
36. See note 23 supra.
37. See note 24 supra. The Supreme Court's definition of "fighting words" is ad-
mittedly somewhat vague. It may be contended that "men of common intelligence"
could also have a common understanding of what conduct gives rise to alarm for the
public safety. The distinction, however, is that the ordinance in Chaplinsky prohibited
conduct-the use of "fighting words" in public-which in itself could cause a breach of
the peace by provoking the addressee to violence. Section 856.021 proscribes conduct
which, rather than itself capable of causing harm, merely indicates that the suspect
may intend to engage in such conduct in the near future.
It can hardly be said that standing behind some shrubbery, or even fleeing upon
the appearance of a police officer is conduct capable of harming others. The police
officer does not need Florida's loitering statute to authorize an arrest if the suspect's
conduct reaches the stage of an attempt to commit a specified crime. An arrest under
this statute is one solely for what the officer believes to be the "evil intentions" of
the suspect, in order to "nip crime in the bud."
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statute. 8 The term "loiter" in section 856.021 does not specifically
define the prohibited acts. Thus the provision appears to be contrary
to the requirements of Papachristou in that it "fails to give a person
of ordinary intelligence fair notice" of what conduct is prohibited
by the statute.3 9
The Ecker court concluded that section 856.021 was not subject to
arbitrary enforcement and that the statute clearly defined the conduct
to be prohibited. In addition, the validity of each arrest under the loit-
ering statute would be tested by requiring the arresting officer to sup-
port with specific and articulable facts 4° his belief that the public safety
was endangered. This check upon the officer's arrest powers, however,
seems to do little to alleviate the statute's vagueness; as one federal
court noted, "The matter is not helped any by the supervisory power
of a judge who is given no more certain a standard when called upon
to decide if he should dismiss charges against the alleged offender."' 41
The Florida court relied upon the Supreme Court case of California
v. Byers42 in upholding the statutory "requirement" of identification
under section 856.021. 43 Byers, however, seems to offer little support
for the court's rationale in the instant case. The law upheld in Byers
was not subject to the infirmities of the Florida law under consideration
in Ecker. The Byers Court disposed of the case solely on fifth amend-
38. See note 21 and accompanying text supra. Cf. Note, Control of Incohate Crime-
New York Anti-Liberating Statute Declared Unconstitutional, 38 ALA. L. REv. 363, 367 &
n.49 (1974), citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35(5) (McKinney 1967) which subjects to
arrest a person who
[1]oiters or remains in or about a school, college or university building or grounds,
not having any reason or relationship involving custody of or responsibility for a
pupil or student, or any other specific, legitimate reason for being there, and
not having written permission from anyone authorized to grant the same ....
See People v. Merolla, 172 N.E.2d 541 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 872 (1961); People
v. Johnson, 161 N.E.2d 9 (N.Y. 1959).
39. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972). The rationale of
an Oregon court in construing a similar loitering provision illuminates the vagueness
inherent in the language of Florida's provision. In City of Portland v. White, 495
P.2d 778 (Or. Ct. App. 1972), the court found that the words "loiter" and "prowl" were
vague and, standing alone, "so elastic that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess their meaning." Nor did it find that the modifying phrase "in a place, at a time
or in a manner not usual for lawabiding persons" rendered these terms any less nebu-
lous. "What seems usual to one law abiding person," said the court, "might seem
quite unusual to another." Id. at 779. Under Florida's loitering statute, as well as under the
ordinance struck down by the Oregon court, the officer's subjective belief is the sole
criteria in the determination of whether an individual's loitering has threatened the
public safety.
40. 311 So. 2d at 109.
41. Goguen v. Smith, 471 F.2d 88, 96 (1st Cir. 1972), afJ'd, 415 U.S. 566 (1974).
42. 402 U.S. 424 (1971).
43. See note 2 supra for text of FLA. STAT. § 856.021 (1975).
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ment grounds. It is evident, however, that, unlike Florida's provision,
California's statute was neither vague, overbroad, nor subject to arbi-
trary enforcement. The California statute provided that all persons in-
volved in an automobile accident which resulted in property damage
were subject to that provision's requirements."4 There was no question
of whether an individual was subject to the statute's proscriptions, nor
was there any necessity for police subjectivity in invoking its applica-
tion as is required by the terms of Florida's loitering provision.
The same Model Penal Code provision adopted by Florida and
promulgated in section 856.021 has been interpreted by a court of a
sister state. The court's decision offers an enlightening approach to
the fifth amendment problem presented by this provision. In People
v. Solomon, 45 a California district court found the statute contained
three elements: (1) refusal to furnish identity, (2) by one loitering on
the streets, (3) under circumstances which threaten the public safety."6
The statute empowered a police officer to demand "suitable identifica-
tion" from an individual only if the officer reasonably believed that
such person was a threat to the public safety. A suspect's refusal to
furnish identification was the final element which rendered the offense
complete, justifying an arrest. "Suitable identification" was construed
as "one carrying reasonable assurance that the identification is authentic
and providing means for later getting in touch with the person . . .- 7
The California court held that the provision for explanation was opera-
tive only to the extent that it assisted in producing credible and reliable
identification. Once this identification had been furnished, the suspect
could not be arrested-even for failing to account for his presence."8
The Ecker court added an additional element to the suitable
identification "defense" to arrest, and in so doing, created a constitu-
tional problem of vagueness which the California court successfully
avoided. To prevent an arrest under the Florida statute, the suspect
44. See notes 28-30 and accompanying text supra.
45. 108 Cal. Rptr. 867 (Ct. App. 1973).
46. Id. at 873.
47. Id.
48. Id. The Solomon court concluded that an explanation of one's presence might
continue to play an important role in authenticating the identification supplied by
the suspect. An alternative means of authentication might be written identification
such as a driver's license. Seemingly, it would be unconstitutional to arrest an individual
because he failed to verify his oral identification by accounting for his presence; to
arrest a person under such circumstances would penalize one who exercised his fifth
amendment privilege by remaining silent. Thus the statute, in effect, requires a person
walking on a public street to carry written identification or risk arrest should he be
stopped and unable to verify his oral identification.
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must provide identification and, in addition, comply with the officer's
orders necessary to remove the threat to the public safety.-9
This method of avoiding arrest is deficient because it lacks standards
to guide either the suspect or the arresting officer. Presumably, an
"order necessary to remove the threat" would be a command to the
suspect to move on. However, the court fails to indicate how far an
officer may order a person to remove himself from the scene, or when
the suspect may return to the area. The suspect is required to guess at
his peril what course of conduct he may lawfully pursue. Seemingly,
this is law making by the moment-to-moment decisions of the police-
man on the beat of the sort condemned by the Supreme Court in
Shuttlesworth50 The Ecker court held that a reasonable explanation
by the suspect sufficient to dispel the officer's belief that a threat to
the public safety existed, was an "additional defense" to an arrest
under the statute. The majority noted that the suspect must be
given his Miranda warnings prior to being compelled to explain
his presence. The court stated, however, that if a voluntary explana-
tion by the suspect dispelled the officer's alarm, no charge could be
made under the statute.51 This additional "defense" of a reasonable
explanation, is also subject to the constitutional infirmity of vagueness.
The court did not indicate what constitutes a "reasonable explanation."
Not only does the officer's subjective belief determine whether "loiter-
ing" threatens the public safety,52 but the adequacy of the explanation
is also prone to subjective evaluation5 3
49. 311 So. 2d at 110.
50. See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90 (1965).
51. 311 So. 2d at 110.
52. The Supreme Court has expressed the constitutional difficulties inherent in allow-
ing arrests based upon such subjective determinations.
"[G]ood faith on the port of the arresting officer is not enough." ... If subjective
good faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would
evaporate, and the people would be "secure in their persons . only in the
discretion of the police.
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964).
53. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia considered an ordinance which
prohibited a person from wandering "about the streets at late or unusual hours . . .
without any visible or lawful business and not giving a good account of himself." The
court commented: "We discern no significant difference . . . between a law licensing
one's presence on a public street upon a police officer's favorable judgment and one
conditioning it upon the officer's satisfaction with the explanation as to why the person
is there." Ricks v. District of Columbia, 414 F.2d 1097, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1968). The effect
of the District of Columbia ordinance was found to be no different than the Jacksonville
ordinance condemned by the Supreme Court in Papachristou. See note 8 supra.
Loitering statutes of other states have been held unconstitutional due to similar
"reasonable explanation" provisions. See, e.g., Arnold v. City and County of Denver, 464
P.2d 515 (Colo. 1970); Alegata v. Commonwealth, 231 N.E.2d 201 (Mass. 1967); City
of Portland v. White, 495 P.2d 778 (Ore. Ct. App. 1972).
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The courts of states with loitering statutes containing similar
"reasonable explanation" provisions have recognized the fifth amend-
ment issue. These courts have held that the suspect's failure to offer
an explanation for his conduct is not to be considered in determining
whether the individual's loitering has threatened the public safety. 4
The provision is merely a procedural safeguard to prevent unjust
application of the statute to a person who, if afforded an opportunity,
could dispel the officer's suspicion by giving a credible explanation for
his presence and actions.55 Whether a reasonable explanation is a de-
fense to an arrest, or whether the failure to offer such an explanation
is an element of the offense, is a meaningless distinction for Miranda
purposes. The individual is subject to arrest should he choose to
exercise his fifth amendment rights and remain silent. Under such
circumstances the Miranda warnings are little more than an empty
formality.58
The "saving clause" of Florida's statute provides that a person
cannot be prosecuted if the arresting officer failed to afford the suspect
an opportunity to identify himself, or to explain his presence prior to
arrest. Additionally, prosecution is precluded if the court finds un-
reasonable either the officer's belief that the suspect was a threat, or
his failure to accept the explanation offered.5 7 Such a provision is little
consolation to a defendant who has been subjected to the indignities
and financial hardship which accompany arrest and detention.58 The
In People v. Berck, 300 N.E.2d 411 (N.Y. 1973), § 250.12 of the MODEL PENAL CODE
as codified in a New York state penal statute, was struck down as unconstitutional.
The highest court of that state held that the statute was vague, violative of the con-
stitutional right to freedom of movement, allowed arrests on suspicion, and was subject
to arbitrary enforcement.
54. See, e.g., State v. Zito, 254 A.2d 769 (N.J. 1969); People v. Berck, 300 N.E.2d
IlI (N.Y. 1973); City of Seattle v. Drew, 423 11.2d 522 (Wash. 1967).
55. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.6, Comment (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
56. Arguably, the "reasonable explanation" provision of Florida's loitering statute
is subject to the charge that it shifts the burden of proof to the accused. He must
show, under threat of arrest, that he is not a potential criminal. It might seem logical
to assume that if the suspect's business was lawful, he would readily furnish an explana-
tion for his conduct which would dispel the officer's alarm, and thus preclude an
arrest. In Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 415 (1966), however, the Supreme Court noted
that
the basic purposes that lie behind the privilege against self-incrimination do not
relate to protecting the innocent from conviction, but rather to preserving the
integrity of a judicial system in which even the guilty are not to be convicted
unless the prosecution "shoulder the entire load."
Therefore, shifting the burden to the accused to prove his innocence, as Florida's
loitering statute seemingly does, is not constitutionally permissible.
57. See note 2 supra for text of FLA. STAT. § 856.021 (1975).
58. See Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion, 70 YALE L.J. 1 (1960); Foote,
Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REV. 493 (1955).
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judge has no more certain a standard to guide him in determining
whether the charges should be dismissed than the policeman has in
making a decision to arrest.59
The Ecker court noted that under section 856.021, prompt arrest
is proper if a person whom the police officer believes to be a threat
flees when approached by such officer. The suspect need not under these
circumstances be given an opportunity to dispel the alarm by disclosing
his purpose or by supplying the officer with identification."° But it may
not be constitutionally permissible to allow flight to constitute probable
cause for an arrest. In Wong Sun v. United States,"1 the Supreme Court
commented that a suspect's flight was insufficient to constitute probable
cause for an arrest.
[I]t is a matter of common knowledge that men who are entirely
innocent do sometimes fly from the scene of a crime through fear
of being apprehended as the guilty parties, or from an unwillingness
to appear as witnesses.62
Since there appears to be no conceivable distinction between using
flight as a basis for a belief that a person has committed a crime and
using it as evidence that he is about to commit a crime, both may
be attacked as unconstitutional presumptions.
The Florida court held that the statute came into operation "only
when the surrounding circumstances suggest[ed] to a reasonable man
some threat and concern for the public safety." 6 3 The court noted
that those circumstances were not very different from those described
by the United States Supreme Court as "specific and articulable facts"
Justice Douglas noted that persons arrested on suspicion, like those arrested for
vagrancy, are the undesirables of society. They are not the "sons of bankers," but are
members of a group who lack "the prestige to prevent an easy laying-on of
hands by the police." Douglas, J., supra at 13.
As Foote points out, even if a person wrongfully arrested under such a statute were
to bring a civil suit for loss of pay, damage to his reputation and other injuries result-
ing from such an arrest, his chances of recovery are slim.
Very few [potential plaintiffs] are persons who are respectable in the sense that
they have some measure of status and financial security in society and have acquired
the kind of reputation which will be "damaged" by illegal police activity ....
... [If the [person] is a skid row "bum" ... or has a record of prior arrests ....
the defendant officers can prove the plaintiff's bad reputation in mitigation of
damages and so poison him in the eyes of the jury.
Foote, supra at 500-01.
59. See note 39 and accompanying text supra.
60. 311 So. 2d at 106.
61. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
62. Id. at 483 n.10 (1963), quoting Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499 (1896).
63. 311 So. 2d at 110.
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in Terry v. Ohio.64 Florida's decision, however, constitutes a clear ex-
tension of the Terry rationale. In Terry, an officer who was investigating
possible criminal conduct, but lacked probable cause to arrest, had
reason to believe that the suspect was armed. The Supreme Court
held that under those circumstances the officer could frisk the suspect
for weapons in order to protect himself from possible harm.6" The
officer's decision to conduct a "stop and frisk" is subject to the same
broad discretion which is conferred by the Florida loitering statute.
Arguably, a request for identification and an order to the suspect
to "move on" is a less serious intrusion than a search of the suspect's
person, but the Court in Terry did not hold that a refusal to allow
such a search or to answer an officer's question or obey an order could
be rendered an offense. To the contrary, in Davis v. Mississippi, 
6
decided 1 year after Terry, the Court strongly suggested that
criminalization of a mere failure to answer an officer's inquiries, with-
out more, would be unconstitutional.6 7
In Davis, the state contended that a suspect could be involuntarily
detained for fingerprinting in connection with a crime which the police
lacked probable cause to believe the person had committed. In support
of its position, the state cited statements by the Supreme Court in
prior cases which approved the general questioning of citizens during
the investigation of a crime. 68 In response to the state's contentions,
the Court noted that these cases stood for no more than the proposition
that
while the police have the right to request citizens to answer
voluntarily questions concerning unsolved crimes they have no right
to compel them to answer. 69
The Court held that detention of the suspects under these circumstances
was an unreasonable seizure under the fourth amendment.70 The
Court did not address the issue of whether such action additionally
violated the suspect's privilege against self-incrimination, preferring
instead to dispose of the case on the narrow fourth amendment ground.
64. 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
65. Id. at 27. The Court was unable to determine from the facts in the record
whether a "seizure" had occurred. The majority noted, however, that "whenever a
police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has
'seized' that person." 392 U.S. at 16.
66. 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
67. Id. at 727 n.6.
68. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477-78 (1966); Culombe v. Connecticut,
367 U.S. 568, 635 (1961).
69. 394 U.S. 727 n.6.
70. Id. at 725.
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Seemingly, the threat of arrest, should one fail to answer an officer's
request for identification under Florida's loitering statute, constitutes
the criminalization condemned by the Supreme Court in Davis. In ad-
dition, the Supreme Court in Papachristou may have disposed of the
question of whether a suspect's refusal to obey an officer's orders "neces-
sary to remove the threat to the public safety" may justify an arrest. 71
The distinction between the Florida statute and the statute upheld
in Terry v. Ohio is significant. In Terry, the Supreme Court allowed
the officer's virtually unfettered discretion to form the basis of a
limited stop and frisk where the suspect's refusal to allow such was not
held to justify an arrest. Florida's statute allows the same discretion to
permit an officer to make a request which, if not complied with, may
subject the suspect to a fine or to imprisonment. The constitutional in-
firmities of Florida's loitering statute, as presently construed, are
legion. Were the United States Supreme Court to review the constitu-
tionality of this statute, in the light of its precedent set by Papachristou,
Florida's statute would likely be stricken. Attacks upon the statute as
being vague and overbroad and subject to arbitrary enforcement would,
it seems, be sustained. Indeed, the Supreme Court might additionally
find the reasonable explanation "defense" in Florida's provision viola-
tive of the fifth amendment.
If the Florida court narrowly construed the statute to require identi-
fication alone, from a person deemed by a police officer to be loitering
in a suspicious manner,'2 the statute might well be upheld. Under the
statute, as so construed, the suspect would not be required to speculate
as to what conduct would render him subject to arrest. Admittedly, the
policeman would have broad discretion in deciding whether to demand
identification from a suspect. However, such an intrusion on an in-
dividual's personal liberty is slight, and compliance with the officer's
request would preclude an arrest. At the present, however, the dissent
of Justices Ervin and Boyd contains a seemingly realistic appraisal of
Florida's loitering statute as construed by the Ecker court.
[This statute] seeks to resurrect constitutionally but in different
verbiage coloration all of the old invasions of personal freedom
of movement of the citizen . . . condemned [by the United States Su-
preme Court] ....
All of the attempted rationalization and effort to distinguish in
principle this new statute from the older vagrancy statute[s] . . .
which were stricken is sheer sophistry .... But today we must manifest
71. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
72. See People v. Solomon, 108 Cal. Rptr. 867, 873 (Ct. App. 1973).
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ourselves to be "law and order" exponents-constitutional guarantees
to the contrary notwithstanding.
DEBORAH MILLER
Zoning Ordinance-ENHANCEMENT OF AESTHETIC VALUES ALONE NOT
SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER IN FLORIDA.-City Of
Coral Gables v. Wood, 305 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
William L. Wood stored his camper-type vehicle in his backyard.
After a neighbor complained to the police, Wood was issued a cita-
tion for violating a Coral Gables zoning ordinance. The ordinance pro-
vided that such vehicles, if kept on private property, must be stored
inside garages.' The trial court found Wood guilty and fined him $15.
On appeal to the circuit court, the judgment was reversed on the
grounds that the ordinance was "facially overbroad, unconstitutionally
vague and violative of the guarantees of the first, fifth and fourteenth
amendments to the United States Constitution."2 In reversing the cir-
cuit court, the Third District Court of Appeal stated that aesthetic
considerations have been held to be valid basis for zoning in Florida.3
The court added that "the Coral Gables ordinance is aimed at pre-
venting unsightly appearances and diminution of property values which
obtain when camper-type vehicles are parked or stored out of doors
in a residential area of the community." 4 Several authorities, including
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, have an-
nounced that aesthetic considerations alone will support a zoning
73. 311 So. 2d at 111-12.
1. CORAL GABLES, FLA., CODE § 4.09(a) (1974), provides:
No House Car, Camp Car, Camper or House Trailer, nor any vehicle, or part of
vehicle, designed or adaptable for human habitation, by whatever name known,
whether such vehicle moves by its own power or by power supplied by separate
unit, shall be kept or parked on public or private property within the City,
except if enclosed within the confines of a garage, and unoccupied; or parked upon
a duly licensed or legally operating parking area, which is not a concomitant and
required under the zoning-or other-ordinance of the City.
2. 305 So. 2d 261, 263 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See Masotti & Selfon, Aesthetic Zoning and the Police Power, 46 J. URBAN L. 773,
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